IOM Member State : Yes

IOM Office in Guinea Bissau: Yes

Population : 1,388,363. *

Population Groups : African 99% (Balanta 30%, Fula 20%, Manjaca 14%, Mandinga 13%, Papel 7%), European and mulatto less than 1%.

Religions : Indigenous beliefs 50%, Muslim 45%,

Christian 5%.

Languages : Portuguese (official), Creole, French, many indigenous languages: Balanta-Kentohe 26%; Pulaar 18%; Mandjak 12%; Mandinka 11%; Pepel 9%; other dialects

Government Type: Republic

Legal System: Republic, multi-party since 1991

Chief of State : President Henrique ROSA (interim; since 28 September 2003); note - a September 2003 coup overthrew the elected government of Kumba YALA; General Verissimo Correia SEABRA served as interim president from 14 to 28 September 2003

Head of Government : Prime Minister Carlos GOMES Junior (since 9 May 2004)

Minister of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants : Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma

Capital : Bissau

* As of 2004, CIA, World Fact Book estimates

** As of 2002, UN Population Division: International Migration

Background on Guinea Bissau

Covering an area of 36 125 km2 with a population of approximately 1,390 000 inhabitants, Guinea – Bissau is partly insular (archipelago of the Bijagos composed of about ninety islands) and partly continental. The climate is tropical with the rainy season ranging from June to October. The country has enormous potential for natural resources, namely cashew nuts, timber, fisheries and husbandry. The agriculture could potentially satisfy the internal demand. The subsoil is rich in bauxite, phosphate and oil (offshore) not yet exploited. In spite of this multiple potential wealth, Guinea Bissau is among the least developed nations in the world ranking 172 out of 177 countries in the Human Development Index (UNDP 2004). The main source of income is derived from cashew nut exports and licensing of fishing rights.

Historical and Political Background

The country has not yet completely overcome the effects of 1998-1999 armed conflict that caused the displacement toward the interior of the country of more than 350,000 peoples, impoverished the country and caused significant destruction to the infrastructures. According to the 2004 National MDG Report, approximately 80% of the population is below the poverty line living with less than US$2 per day, out of these 20% lives in extreme poverty with less than US$1 per day. The access to social services including health, education, water and electricity supply is extremely limited, with rankings below the regional and sub-regional average.

The low level of internal revenue renders Guinea Bissau highly dependent on external aid (approximately 80% of the State budget is assured by external aid). However, Guinea Bissau has alienated a good number of donors, due to incoherent economic and fiscal policies and absence of a credible governing system. The recent Lisbon meeting on Guinea Bissau with the development partners held in February 2005 in preparation for the Round Table Conference, has confirmed that additional support is linked to the consolidation of democracy, peace, stability and return to full constitutional order, including through the realization of free and fair presidential elections during the first semester of 2005, as envisaged in the transitional charter.

But poverty alone does not fully explain the current situation in the country. The roots of the deep political and social crisis that has characterized GNB for most of its post-independence history can rather be found in the following structural conditions: a dysfunctional and weak state, bad and inefficient governance, a fractured political elite, and a highly divided and interventionist military.

Independent since 1973, Guinea – Bissau suffered great instability with numerous politico – military and social trepidations. The 1998 army rebellion degenerated into a civil war and led to the overthrow of the President Joao Bernardo Vieira in power for 18 years. In January 2000, President Koumba Yala was democratically elected with 72% of votes; but quickly he opted for an erratic governance system characterized by frequent changes of government and human rights abuses. The harassment of judges and censoring of the press, the refusal to promulgate the new constitution approved by the Parliament, dissolution of the parliament and frequent adjournment of legislative elections contributed to a constitutional crisis. This situation discouraged donors and placed the country in a deep financial crisis and rendered the government incapable of paying salaries of military and civil servants, including those of key sectors as education and health. Between 2000 and 2002, the country faced social instability with street manifestations, repeated strikes due to unpaid salaries and a deep social discontent. It is within this deteriorated political environment that the 14 September 2003 coup took place.

This bloodless coup, resulted in the overthrow of the President Koumba Yala, a change supported by the population, and the taking over of the power by the Chief of General Staff of the Army, General Verissimo Correia Seabra.

The negotiations following the coup led to the signing by all but one of the political parties of a National Transition Charter. The Charter provided for the transfer of power to civilian authority, the nomination of a Transition President, and the holding of legislative elections within six months of its signing and presidential elections within one year of the swearing-in of the elected deputies.

The political transition that followed the military intervention of September 2003 bore some very encouraging signs of progress. Following the elections for the President and the Vice-President of the Supreme Court of Justice and the conduct of credible legislative elections on 28 and 30 March 2004 and the subsequent installation of a new National Popular Assembly and a new Government, the first phase of the transition has thus been completed.

Regrettably, the military mutiny of 6 October, which resulted in the assassination of the Chief of General Staff, General Verissimo Correia Seabra, and the spokesman for the armed forces, Colonel Domingos de Barros, has jeopardized the incipient gains achieved towards recovery by the new authorities and demonstrated the fragility of the continuing transitional process and of the society as a whole.

The revolt was led by a group of officers who stated that their actions had been motivated mainly by grievances over salaries, poor living conditions and corruption within the military hierarchy; and insisted that the mutiny had not been a coup d’état. Subsequently, they sought, and obtained from the authorities, the appointment of their nominee, Major General Tagme Na Waie, as new Chief of General Staff. This, and the other appointments of the new military high commands were widely perceived as caving in on the part of the civilian authorities to pressures from the military, and as a sign of further erosion of the authority of the constitutional Government and its institutions. The mutiny has also increased the danger of polarization of Guinea-Bissau society along ethnic lines, especially given the widespread perception that the revolt was inspired by Balanta elements in the armed forces, intent on assuming control of the military establishment.

The military mutiny is one illustration of the mutually reinforcing challenges -poverty, deep political and social crisis, and structural conditions- that constitute a fertile ground where almost any grievance can trigger the eruption of violence.

The forthcoming presidential elections –to take place on 19 June 2005- should put a formal end to the transition set in motion by the Political Transitional Charter and mark the full restoration of constitutional order in the country. However, if poorly prepared and managed, these elections may constitute a source of tension and further instability.

Human Development : Human Rights and Protection

The current human rights situation must be judged against a background where people do not enjoy their Economic and Social rights given the economic situation which has ironically been both the cause and consequence of political instability over the years. While there is an active civil society and the Guinea Bissau Human Rights League has been broadcasting programs on local radio twice a week to inform the population of their human rights, a lot of work still needs to be done at all levels to instill a human rights culture. Full realization of civil and political rights is difficult in circumstances where there is an under-resourced administration of justice, an absence of a police academy and a dysfunctional penitentiary system (no suitable facility for long term prisoners and short term detention facilities which do not meet the UN Minimum Standards). Although recently have not been reported widespread human rights abuses, female genital mutilation and forced marriages are still common in rural areas.

Systems and structures for child protection are weak. Institutional capacities to fully harmonize national legislation with the Convention on the Rights of the Child need to be strengthened to achieve goals related to birth registration, FGM, Girls education and child and youth protection issues related to HIV/AIDS and sexual abuse and exploitation.

It should be noted that the current government is more open to human rights issues and has a better record than it's predecessors.  There are efforts underway to have an Inter-Ministerial Committee legalized, on which each Ministry will be represented. This would allow the government to have a well-defined policy on a broad range of human rights issues.

Demobilization and Reintegration

Since the year of its independence, Guinea-Bissau has seen several processes aimed at the demilitarization of the society and at the reduction of the political interferences of the army. After the 1998-1999 conflict, in 2000 the President of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau promulgated a decree authorizing the implementation of the “Programa de Desmobilização, Reinserção e Reintegração dos Ex-Combatentes da Guiné-Bissau” (PDRRI). Funded by WB and bilateral donors, PDRRI is a governmental program that since the beginning has taken advantage of IOM technical assistance - during the preparatory phase as well as during the main Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration ones. Moreover IOM has provided the Financial and Procurement Management of the whole Program. Aiming to help the peace-building process, the national reconciliation and the socio-economic recovery of the country, the PDRRI started in August 2000 and will last until beginning 2006. The PDRRI aims at a) demobilizing the exceeding soldiers and policemen as well as all the militiamen involved in the 1998-1999 conflict (concluded), b) the reinsertion of all the demobilized (concluded) and c) the reintegration of all the demobilized and Ex-Combatants involved in all conflicts since the 1954 independence struggle (on going).

At present, in reason of limited funds, the Reintegration has not been granted to the totality of ex-soldiers. Out of 11.445 beneficiaries that applied, only 7,186 most vulnerable among demobilized and ex-soldiers are enrolled in the Reintegration program. The Reintegration component of the PDRRI is implemented by a network of local and international NGOs.

The following table shows the figures of the PDRRI.

Situation of the Internal Displaced Persons

Although the prevailing instability in Guinea-Bissau following the civil war of 1998 – 1999 improved slightly, the political situation at the end of 2001 remained 'dangerous and volatile' ( UN SC, 14 December 2001). While nearly all of the 300,000 to 350,000 persons initially displaced by the conflict in 1998 were thought to have returned to their homes, a string of ongoing political crises in 2001 and early 2002 continued to threaten peace and democracy in the country.

Background and causes of displacement

Civil war erupted in Guinea-Bissau in June 1998 when armed forces mutinied against the government. The mutiny was sparked by an attempted government witch–hunt of the army general staff for alleged collaboration with Senegalese rebels of the separatist Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance (MFDC). The outbreak of war and the subsequent dispatch of Senegalese and Guinean forces to the nation's capital in support of (then) President Joao Bernardo Vieira led to the internal displacement of over 300,000 civilians (Manley, November 1998).

Intermittent fighting plagued the country for the remainder of 1998, but by early 1999 a relative calm had returned to the capital, Bissau. West African peacekeeping forces (ECOMOG) were deployed to the capital starting in December 1998, and by March 1999 all Senegalese and Guinean troops were withdrawn. The calm in Guinea–Bissau was short–lived however, and another bout of fighting commenced in May 1999. The clashes, lasting for two days, prompted a new exodus from the capital and resulted in the take–over of the government by the Junta Militar.

Following the fighting of May 1999, a fragile calm returned to the country. Presidential elections in January 2000 resulted in the successful transition of the government from military to democratic rule, bringing President Kumba Yala to power. However, more trouble lay ahead. In November 2000, in an episode well-documented by Amnesty International, the government made several hundred arrests following an attempted coup by Brigadier Ansumane Mané, a former leader of the Junta Militar, who was killed by forces loyal to the government later that month (AI, 17 August 2001).

Since that time, the political situation in Guinea-Bissau has remained troubled. The low points of 2001 – as documented by UN IRIN – included President Yala's dismissal, in September, of two Supreme Court judges and their subsequent detention on dubious charges of corruption; in December, an alleged coup attempt by some members of the military, resulting in numerous arrests; and, during the inauguration in December of the country's third prime minister in less than two years, the President's warning that any politician who plotted with the military to overthrow his government would be shot (IRIN, 16 November 2001; IRIN-WA, 7 December 2001; IRIN-WA, 14 December 2001). In March 2002, the UN Secretary-General reported a "slight overall improvement with respect to the political situation and governance, although certain crucial aspects still cause concern". (UN SC, 26 March 2002)

Although security along the border with the Casamance region of Senegal improved somewhat towards the end of 2001, the UN Secretary–General, in his December report to the UN Security Council, stated that occasional incursions into Guinea–Bissau by MFDC rebels had occurred, and that while no major factional fighting had been reported armed attacks against civilians were continuing. He cited the wide circulation of small arms inside the country and the unresolved issue of reintegration of demobilized former combatants as potential security threats ( UN SC, 14 December 2001). Three months later, however, the UN Secretary-General reported further improvements in the border security situation. With regards to the small arms problem, the government had decided to establish a national commission to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, with assistance from various international sources ( UN SC, 26 March 2002).

Conditions of displacement

It has been widely reported that nearly all of the 300,000 to 350,000 persons forced to flee their homes during the war in 1998 have completed their return home – the inference being that at least a residual IDP population has not yet returned. However, no data is readily available for this group.

USCR reported that some 50,000 persons were still internally displaced in Guinea–Bissau at the end of 2000, but that for the most part these IDPS were able to return home over the course of the year (USCR, 19 June 2001). Although there were new displacements in the capital in November 2000 following an outbreak of violence between the government and elements of the military, these skirmishes did not last long and residents returned to their homes shortly thereafter.

The US State Department, in its country report of 2000, also indicates that all areas of Guinea–Bissau were open to returning citizens during the year, and that virtually all of the 350,000 persons internally displaced by the conflict had returned to their homes (US DOS, February 2001). The 2001 report made no further reference to internally displaced persons.

While general information points to the near complete return of IDPs in Guinea–Bissau, there is however no specific data on how these persons are coping in their regions of origin. According to the UN Security Council, over 80 percent of the citizens of Guinea–Bissau live in poverty and few opportunities for employment exist. The abundance of landmines, particularly in areas around the border with Casamance, is another factor that may adversely affect the successful reintegration of IDPs into their original communities.

Humanitarian response

Information is scant about international aid to IDPs in Guinea–Bissau. In 1999, ICRC and the National Society provided non–food aid to people living in houses damaged during the hostilities. It was estimated that some 18,000 persons were living in 2,500 such homes throughout the capital. The ICRC also delivered messages on behalf of displaced persons and their families (ICRC, 31 August 2000).

In 2001, the African Development Fund (ADF) funded a rehabilitation and poverty reduction project with a US$6.22 million loan and a US$1.05 million grant – with the objective of rehabilitating and facilitating access to basic community infrastructure, increasing the income of the poor and integrating marginalized people and ex-servicemen into production networks. The UN Security Council reported in May 2001 that there were as many as 12,000 former combatants awaiting reintegration into society. By March 2002, a preliminary list of just over 2,700 eligible military personnel had been drawn up under the government's demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration programme. The programme, estimated to cost about US$ 20 million, continues to be supported by a multi-donor trust fund administered by the World Bank ( UN SC, 26 March 2002).

With regard to the demining process, ongoing activities have focused on the most heavily populated areas. By 31 May 2001, mine–clearing operations led by HUMAID, an international NGO, had resulted in the destruction of over 2,000 mines. It is estimated that US$2 million would be needed to remove the estimated 5,000 mines remaining in and around the capital. As reported by the UN Secretary–General at the end of 2001, a Centre for Anti-Mine Action, newly-established by the Guinea–Bissau government, estimated that about 20,000 mines still remained in the country. Demining operations are expected to intensify in 2002, once a local non-governmental organization, LUTCAM, with 70 demining staff, starts its activities.

The UN Office in Guinea–Bissau (UNOGBIS) has had a wide–ranging mandate in support of the country's peace–building process, based on promoting and supporting good governance, human rights and economic development ( UN SC, 14 December 2001).

Security Sector Reform

There seems to be a growing consensus among Bissau-Guinean stakeholders that the reform of the armed forces is a critical and urgent condition for the consolidation of peace, stability and democracy in the country. Indeed the Government, the armed forces themselves, most political parties and civil society bodies in Guinea-Bissau, all have given indication to the United Nations System (UNS) of their interest to receive support for a “profound restructuring of the military institution”. In this context, the military hierarchy has established three specialized Commissions to analyse three key dimensions; (i) Defense Act and military regulations, (ii) retirement for members of the Armed Forces and (iii) deployment. In addition, the armed forces are working with the Secretariat of State for Public Administration on the registration of all military personnel, with a view to obtaining accurate figures of military personnel in active service.

At the 11 February 2005 donor mini-conference in Lisbon, several donors made pledges of initial contributions and technical assistance for security sector reform. UNDP is ready to channel these and any future funds through its existing Crisis Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund, specifically its Security Sector Reform and Transitional Justice service line.

Mine Action

Since 2003 until June 2004, 41 persons were killed or injured by mines and UXO bringing the total since 1980 to 665. Landmine survivors are most prevalent in Northern region (35%), in Bissau capital and immediate surrounding (25%) in the Southern part of the country (19%) and in Eastern region (21%). Since the independence war, the countryside still suffers of UXO and land mine contamination while Bissau became a priority in mine action after the 1998/1999 conflict. The main focus of PAAMI and the National Humanitarian Programme on Mine Action supported by UNDP and UNOPS is presently in the Capital. A total of 487.214 m2 has been so far surveyed and marked, within the seventeen minefields and UXOs battlefields already identified in Bissau Capital. Partners of the Programme are HUMAID and LUTCAM, two national NGOs that collaborate in a) mine risk education, b) creation of the quality control nucleus, and c) survey and delimitation of mined areas. Handicap International is collaborating to strengthening of the national NGOs capacities. The two national mine clearance NGOs had rid close to 761,381.46 m2 of 2,599 landmines (2,535 AP + 64 AT) and 34,942 UXOs (included stray ammunitions) by 24 of Nov 2004. PAAMI estimates to eliminate the mine risk in Bissau by 2006 and in the rest of the country by 2009, pending availability of funding.

Direct Budgetary support

The current state budget shows a financing gap of approximately U$32 million for 2005.

A special Trust Fund, administered by UNDP, was set-up in 2004 to support the country in the implementation of its Emergency Economic Management Plan. The Emergency Economic Management Fund (EEMF) for Guinea-Bissau is a multi-donor Fund to enable the government to resume the provision of social services and key public administration activities. The Fund, intended to be operational until June 2005, is the basis of the partnership prescribed by both the ECOSOC Ad-hoc Advisory Group on Guinea-Bissau and the Working Group of the Security Council on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa.

To date, almost U$ 5 million have been channeled through the EEMF in budgetary support to the Government of Guinea Bissau, thanks to the timely contributions of the Governments of the Netherlands, Sweden, France, Portugal, and Brazil. Salary payments have resumed for more than 11,000 civil servants from 24 Ministries and 17 Autonomous institutions. The Trust Fund has also provided financing for items critical for the minimum functioning of the state apparatus in the priority sectors such as education and to provide technical assistance to key divisions in the Ministry of Finance in the areas of budget management, revenue collection, and expenditure control with a view to promote fiscal responsibility and restore the confidence of the donors.

Financial contributions from the Governments of Portugal and France to be channeled through the EEMF are expected shortly after pledges made during the Donor Conference on Guinea Bissau in Lisbon last February.

Funding for the Electoral process

A consolidated budget totaling €4.9 million euros for registration and electoral operations was submitted to Guinea-Bissau’s international partners on 17 January 2005. UNDP was mandated by the UN Secretary General to (i) provide technical assistance and (ii) coordinate and mobilize international assistance to the forthcoming electoral process. UNOGBIS, in turn, has been mandated to coordinate the international supervision exercise. International assistance for the elec

Sectoral Overview

Agriculture and Food Security

As a whole, the primary sector including agriculture, cattle and stock breeding, fishing and forestry development, constitute the backbone of the economy. It accounts for 50% of the GDP, provides 85% of employment and contributes for nearly 93% to exports. The sector is based on primarily subsistence agriculture, and is limited by the vicious circle of "weak investments - low productivity - low incomes". The food insecurity is present in rural areas, because of the bad management of the cycle production/consumption throughout the year. Indeed, in spite of agro-ecological conditions favorable to the rise of an agriculture with good potential, the national cereal production is not enough to meet the needs for the country. The standards of consumption selected are 130 kg/habitant for rice, 8,5 kg for corn, 36,6 kg for dry cereals, that is to say 175 kg of cereals per person/year. Under these conditions, with a population of 1,252,560 inhabitants in 2003, the current cereal needs is approximately 219,198 tons including 162,708 tons of rice paddy and 56,490 tons of other cereals. The production available being about 125 to 140 000 tons, the country records a deficit of about 50 000 to 65 000 tons. This deficit generally corresponds to the annual volume of imported rice evaluated at more than 50 000 tons.

Health and Nutrition

The health system coverage continues to be low. For 40 percent of the population the access to a public health service is within 5 km. Statistically, there is one doctor for each 7,230 inhabitants and one nurse for each 717 inhabitants but the distribution of the health personnel is uneven. Bissau sector accounts for more than 60% of the health personnel and for approximately 70% of the doctors. Malaria is the main cause of death. Approximately 50% of the medical consultations are for this disease that has a 17% prevalence. The HIV infection is spreading. The National prevalence has increased from 8% in 2002 to the 11.5% in 2003. Previous estimations for 2004 situate the HIV/AIDS infection around the 14%. Infant mortality is estimated respectively at 100-120/1000 and 200 – 250/1000 in urban and rural areas.

The insufficient diet and the weak nutritional contribution for the vulnerable populations, combined with precarious sanitary conditions, explain the very high level of malnutrition. The nutritional level of more than 30% of the children under 5 years old is lower than normal. The analysis of the body mass of the adults shows that 40% are in chronic deficiency. In the north of the country, unquestionable standard of endemic anemia caused by the bad nutrition are frequent. The effort of increasing food availability in favor of the poorest, will have thus to be continued in order to satisfy the energy needs for the population which, according to forecasts' relating to the increase in population and the changes of structure of the families, will increase by 20% between 2003 and 2010.

Education

School-age children represent approximately 6,4% of the population of GNB. According to the latest statistics, net school enrolment rate is 41%. The illiteracy rate is 63,4%, and is significantly higher for women. Completion rate up to 5th grade is estimated at 43.6 %.

State the schools have opened as a normal school year in 2005. However, delivery of this basic social service faces enormous constraints mainly related to: teacher’s salaries, lack of adequate infrastructure resulting in school over-population, and lack of teaching materials. In addition to constituting a major threat to the pursuit of a normal school year, these factors affect the quality of education. The situation of the education sector is marked by a significant institutional weakness which limits the state’s ability to intensify efforts in this effort and to achieve the Education for All objectives

Water and Sanitation

According to the National Institute for Water and Energy in 2003, only 54.6% of the population has canalized water and 45.4% collects water from wells. Just 5.1% of the Bissau Guinean population has access to clean canalized water. Following the same pattern, approximately 35% of the population has no access to any kind of latrines.

Transportation

The surface transport infrastructure in Guinea Bissau has 2755 Km extension, having only 770 km paved. Almost the totality is continental with the road infrastructure in the islands amounting only to 79 km of which 13 paved. Almost 50% of the national and international grid is asphalted while less than 30% of the regional and of 10% local grids are asphalted. During the rainy season most of the Quinara and Tombali Regions remain almost inaccessible, as happens to numerous other regions. Furthermore, the lack of bridges on the numerous rivers of the country augments the difficulties. The poor state of the transport infrastructures hampers the commercial interchanges affecting the producers in the rural areas and the final consumers in the urban areas. For the air transport the situation is worst, at present only Bissau has a functioning airport.

Communications

Health Issues

Medical facilities are virtually non-existent in Guinea-Bissau and should not be relied on by travelers. Every day, Monday to Saturday, there are flights from Bissau to Dakar, Senegal, where acceptable levels of medical care are available.

Please take in consideration the following important health precautions and advices

To avoid getting sick...

Below vaccinations are recommended for people traveling to countries in West Africa

Guinea Bissau at a glance

Among them the EU and the Netherlands Government.

The main local and international NGOs partners involved are COOPI, Divutec, ADIM and ADPP.